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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
AS APPLIED TO CUSTODIANS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL RECORDS
WILLIAM H. FRASER
One of the most critical areas of the courts' inquisitorial power in-
volves organizational documents-books and records of the business,
social, and political combines so much a part of the modern American
scene. The development of the "organization man," and the diverse
associations to which he belongs, has focused government attention-
and regulation-upon the activities of large numbers of combinations,
associations, and organizations. Perhaps it is pertinent to ask what
areas of organization activity remain immune from the government
subpoena. When may an officer or member rely upon the privileges he
could assert with regard to his private affairs?
One privileged area long subject to advancing restriction has had
new vitality returned to it.' The privilege against self-incrimination,
the "bulwark against iniquitous methods of prosecution," 2 was held to
extend to oral testimony concerning the whereabouts of union records
by a custodian who, in response to a subpoena duces tecum and a
subpoena ad testificandum, stated he did not have the demanded
papers in his possession.3
Joseph Curcio was the secretary-treasurer of Local 269 of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters during a grand jury investigation
of union-management racketeering in the New York area. Widespread
charges that Local 269 was a "phantom local" chartered for the ex-
press purpose of gaining control of the New York Joint Council and
was controlled by convicts, gangsters, and hoodlums had been circu-
lated in the local press and was one of the specific areas of inquiry
before the grand jury. Mr. Curcio was served with two subpoenas-a
personal subpoena ad testificandum and a subpoena duces tecum ad-
dressed to him as custodian of the records of Local 269. He appeared
before the grand jury but failed to produce the requested books and
records. He testified that he was the secretary-treasurer of Local 269,
that the union had maintained a set of books and records, that they
had not been in his possession at the time the subpoenas were served,
and that they were not now in his possession. He refused, on the
1 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
2 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), at 699.
3 Curcio v. United States, footnote 1, supra.
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ground of self-incrimination, to answer any questions as to the where-
abouts of the documents or who had possession of them.
The district court directed Mr. Curcio to answer a selected fifteen
questions relating to when he had last seen the records or who might
presently have them.4 He attempted to justify his claim of privilege,
but the court ruled that he had not made a sufficient showing of possible
incrimination. When he persisted in his refusal to answer the ques-
tions, he was summarily adjudged in criminal contempt and sentenced
to six months in jail, provided that he could purge himself of the con-
tempt by answering the questions.
In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, through Judge Medina, held that the petitioner had failed to
show the fifteen questions might incriminate him, that the privilege
against self-incrimination did not attach to the questions put to him
relating to his failure to produce the books and records, and that he
had been accorded a fair hearing.'
On certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, the Govern-
ment withdrew its contention that the burden of showing possible in-
crimination had not been met. So the issues before the Court nar-
rowed to considering whether the privilege against self-incrimination,
personal to the petitioner, attached to questions relating to the pos-
session and whereabouts of books and records which he had failed to
produce pursuant to the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed the
decisions of the lower courts.' In a unanimous opinion, the Court
found that the representative duty which requires custodians to pro-
duce corporate or association records in such cases did not require oral
testimony from the witness as to the circumstances of his failure to
produce. The privilege against being "compelled to be a witness
against himself" proscribed his being compelled, in the absence of a
grant of adequate immunity, to condemn himself by his own oral testi-
mony, even in relation to unprivileged books and records which he had
been ordered to produce.
It should be noted that Mr. Curcio's conviction rested solely on his
- Typical questions from the fifteen upon which the contempt order was based are:
(1) Referring to the books and records of Local 269 of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, have you at any time been in custody of those books and records? (2) Did
you have custody and control of these records last Thursday? (3) Who has any of
these records today, if you know? (4) Who had any or all of these records a week
ago yesterday?
5234 F.2d 470 (1956).




refusal to testify pursuant to the subpoena ad testificandum, as he had
not been charged with failure to produce the demanded documents.
While the history of the privilege against self-incrimination in this
area antedates it,7 the leading case modernly is Wilson v. United
States.! Previous to the Wilson case, the Court had held that the officer
of a corporation could claim no privilege on the ground that the cor-
poration might be incriminated.9 But Wigmore stated the rule to be
that an officer might refuse to present the demanded documents on the
ground that he personally might be incriminated by them."0 This was
the rule in England" and in several states."
The majority in the Wilson case refused to adopt the rule of these
states. The Court ruled that the privilege was a personal one reserved
to natural individuals and that the corporation was a creature of the
state, drawing its powers and very existence from a grant of the state.
The corporation could not assert a privilege with regard to the subpoe-
naed documents, and the officer acted only as its agent in the retention
and maintenance of them. He could be forced to turn them over to his
successor by the corporation and was amenable to that body for any
disposition it might require. Since the officer of a corporation held the
documents only as an agent, he could assert no personal privilege as to
their production. The Court further pointed out that the records
sought were those which all corporations were required to maintain and
were of a semi-public nature. Thus, two independent grounds for the
Wilson holding emerge: (1) the peculiar nature of corporate bodies
and (2) the fact that the records demanded were required to be kept
by law.
This rule as applied to corporate bodies was implemented and
affirmed by a number of later decisions." Grant v. United States ex-
tended the rule to the records of dissolved corporations, holding that
such records retained their "public character" and were not privi-
leged." In United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., the Second Circuit,
7 Rex v. Purnell, 1 Wm. BI. (Eng) 37 (1748); see dissent by McKenna, J., in
Wilson v. United States for citation and discussion of common law precedent in this
area.
8221 U.S. 361 (1911).
0 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The basis for the decision was a holding that
only natural persons were entitled to claim the privilege against self-incrimination.
204 WIGMorE, EvDENCE, § 2259 (1st ed. 1905).
11 Rex v. Purnell, footnote 7, supra.
1I; re Moser, 138 Mich. 302, 101 N.W. 588 (1904) ; Ex parte Hedden, 29 Nev.
352, 90 Pac. 737 (1907).
"3 Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913).
"4 See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913).
1531 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied 279 U.S. 863 (1929).
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speaking through Judge Learned Hand, held that the custodian of
corporate documents which had been subpoenaed could be compelled
to identify them. "(S)ince the production can be forced, it may be
made effective by compelling the producer to declare that the docu-
ments are genuine."' 6 Brown v. United States held that the officer of
an unincorporated association must present the demanded documents
to the judge for determination of their incriminating character in order
to assert a privilege against self-incrimination with regard to such
documents." It had also been held that the officer who does not pro-
duce the books in response to a subpoena is under an affirmative duty
to explain what happened to them. It should be noted that, after the
Curcio decision, the effect of these last-cited cases is somewhat lim-
ited.19 The Curcio opinion does not discuss them.
In 1944, the Supreme Court established that the books and records
of an unincorporated labor union were subject to subpoena and that
the custodian of them could exercise no personal privilege upon the
ground that the records might tend to incriminate him as an individ-
ual.2" In the White case, the Court stated:
But individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group,
cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to
be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the
rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association of
which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its obligations.
In their official capacity, therefore, they have no privilege against self-
incrimination. And the official records and documents of the organiza-
16 31 F.2d at 234. But see discussion in Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 188 (1957),
at 124.17 276 U.S. 134 (1928). Brown was an officer of a furniture dealers association. A
federal grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum to Brown seeking certain records and
correspondence in his possession. He refused to produce them to the grand jury on the
grounds that the association was not a legal entity subject to suit and that he had not
been properly subpoenaed and sworn. The Supreme Court held that he could not
raise the privilege against self incrimination for the first time on appeal where he had
not produced the documents for the lower court's ruling on that plea. The Court
specifically reserved the question as to whether Brown stood in such a relation to the
records as to have had a privilege had he properly invoked it.
'1 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950), where the Court suggested in dicta
that a witness might be tried for obstructing justice where he failed to explain the
non-production, and Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
19 The Curcio case holds specifically that a witness is able to assert the constitu-
tional privilege in response to questions concerning his failure to produce subpoenaed
records and further suggests that the privilege exists with regard to all oral testimony
except the identification of those records which are produced, upon which the court
specifically reserved judgment. It should be noted that the witness in the Bryan case,
note 18, supra, did not assert the privilege against self-incrimination, but merely stated
that she could not produce the records without authorization.
20 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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tion that are held by them in a representative rather than in a personal
capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against self-
incrimination, even though the production of the papers might tend to
incriminate them personally .... Such records and papers are not the
private records of the individual members or officers of the organiza-
tion .... 21
The test to be applied to determine whether the organization was of
such a character as to fall within the scope of this rule was:
[W] hether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a par-
ticular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope
of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or
represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents,
but rather to embody their common or group interests only.22
Thus the custodian of an "impersonal" association could be com-
pelled to produce books and records, the maintenance of which was not
required by law. It had long since been accepted that the peculiar
nature of corporate bodies was sufficient grounding for a lack of per-
sonal immunity as to the production of their records, 2 and it was later
held that not even an individual could assert a privilege as to records
required to be kept by law in the exercise of valid government regula-
tion of the subject to which the records alluded. 4
The Wilson decision that a corporate custodian could not raise the
privilege with regard to corporate records was extended to unions
in the White opinion, and further, the Court laid down a test to deter-
mine which associations and combinations came within that rule and
which did not. But in Shapiro v. United States, the language of the
Wilson case was relied on heavily as authority for the proposition that
no privilege could be raised as to records required by law to be main-
tained." The validity and limits of this exception are beyond the
scope of this Comment, except as they affect the privilege of custo-
dians in particular.2" These two rules, one applicable to custodians
- 322 U.S. at 699.
22 322 U.S. at 701. Unions were held clearly to fall within this rule.
23 United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950) ; Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913) ; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923).
' Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), holds that the privilege, which exists
as to private papers, does not protect individuals against being forced to produce records
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information.
25 335 U.S. at 16 (1948).
26 The Shapiro decision was a five-to-four ruling. The facts of the case would limit
the holding to those instances where the attempt to raise the privilege was to thwart
the particular purpose intended to be effected by the requirement to maintain records.
Thus, a privilege as to sales tax records might exist where the individual was under
investigation for running a lottery in connection with his business, but not in a suit for
failure to pay taxes.
19)5s]
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only and the other to all individuals, have been blended so artlessly
in a number of later decisions as to make unclear the limitations of
either."
Government regulation of association activity requires a variety of
records to be maintained. While there is language in Wilson which,
when lifted from context, might support a thesis that all records of
an individual or association which were required to be maintained by
law were "public" records which could not be the subject of a privi-
lege,2" Shapiro v. United States indicates that the non-privileged area
is not that broad. A vigorous dissent in Shapiro should be the basis
for still further restriction upon this rule, that has as its source an
illogical "make-weight" argument in the Wilson case."
The Court in United States v. White clearly grounded its decision
upon the nature of the organization and its activities. No issue was
raised as to whether the records sought were required by law. A test
based upon the impersonal character of the membership and activities
was the criterion used by the Court to determine whether the custo-
dian could assert a personal privilege as to those records. And a clear
implication that the court felt there were organizations whose custo-
dians could assert a privilege is raised by its statement of a test to
so determine. The scope of this test was left to future decisions.
In spite of the clear language of the White case as to the test for
determining whether the custodian of an association's records may
assert a privilege, subsequent cases have failed to develop the test
by application. The confusion that is reflected in cases which should
present the question squarely has resulted in obscuring the test of im-
personality, rather than in clarifying it. For instance, the bland asser-
tion in the Shapiro case that "corporations and associations are
27 See United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1951), discussed in the text
insfra.
28",,... (T)he principle applies not only to public documents in public offices, but
also to records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable informa-
tion of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation, and
the enforcement of restrictions validly established. There the privilege which exists
as to private papers cannot be maintained." 221 U.S. at 380 (1911).29 Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Shapiro case points out that the Wilson
opinion was actually grounded on the rule there enunciated to effect sound regulation
of such artificial persons. To extend the records-required-by-law argument to its
logical limits would result in such a sweeping restriction of the individual privilege
against self-incrimination as to be obviously contrary to a number of valid precedents
in this area. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, of transactions which are appropriate subjects of government regulation.
Shapiro had refused to produce certain records required under O.P.A. regulations in
force during World War II. He asserted that the documents were privileged upon the
basis that they might tend to incriminate him. See also Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582 (1946) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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required to keep records for state and federal tax and regulatory
purposes, therefore, no privilege exists" does violence to both rules
derived from the Wilson case. It ignores the impersonality test to
be applied to associations and also seems to impose a limitation on
the purposes for which the government may require the keeping of
non-privileged records2 ° The number of appellate cases discussing
the issue is not large, and perhaps some comment will illustrate the
course of the law since the White case was decided in 1944.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Fleischman,"' stated in
dictum that the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee was an organi-
zation with a character so impersonal as to deny a custodian any
privilege in the production of its records. But in that case the court
was not required to rule on the problem, since the basis upon which
the defendant had refused to produce the papers demanded by a con-
gressional committee was that she did not possess them. She did not
raise an issue of her personal self-incrimination. The value of the
dictum is perhaps best indicated by the Court's citation of Brown v.
United States 2 for the proposition that the Wilson rule as to corporate
records was applicable to unincorporated organizations as well. The
holding in Brown was that, to sustain the privilege, the non-corporate
custodian must produce the documents to the judge in order that he
may determine whether they are incriminating or not. Such a holding
infers that a privilege exists if the documents are in fact incriminat-
ing. The Supreme Court, in Fleischman, cites the White case for the
proposition that the officers of any association are as responsible for
the production of association records as a corporate officer would be."
In United States v. Field" trustees of a bail fund were held in con-
tempt for failure to produce the records of their trusteeship. The
Second Circuit quoted that portion of the White case which stated
that official records held in "a representative rather than in a personal
capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege. . . 2"' and
went on to assert that trustees of a trust fund, even more clearly than
union officers, are acting as representatives of a group, rather than in
their own purely private interest. No mention was made of the nature
of the association; thus the test laid down in the White case as to the
nature of an organization to whose records the privilege would not
3o See footnote 26, supra.
31339 U.S. 349 (1950).
32 226 U.S. 134 (1928). See note 17, supra.
0 339 U.S. at 358.
34 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951).
35 193 F.2d at 97.
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attach was not discussed. The test of whether a custodian was "rep-
resentative" or not is dearly no test at all. If there is a group of any
sort and an agent has custody of their books, he serves by definition
in a "representative" capacity. Thus the Field case renders meaning-
less the rule in White while purporting to follow it. And here again
the vitality even of that remarkable case is lessened by an alterna-
tive, hard-to-follow application of the Shapiro rule. The law which
required bail bondsmen to maintain records subject to government
inspection was not cited. The court recognized that some officers of
a public or private character could raise the privilege. It is apparent
that a contrary holding would require bank presidents to disclose
their own embezzlements and public officials, bribes they had accepted.
But they applied the Shapiro rule, because the duty of these "appel-
lants was much more direct and immediate than any undertaken by
wholesalers and retailers who continued in their respective businesses
after the OPA regulations . . . went into force." This comparative
voluntariness test is substituted for the finding of a statute or regula-
tion requiring the keeping of specific records.
The Field case attempts to ground its decision on either or both
of the two grounds discussed above for not finding the privilege. It
lacks conviction in each particular. The fact that five circuit judges
and one Supreme Court justice sat in judgment on various aspects of
this case,36 indicates the lack of definition which has been given the
respective rules governing use of the privilege with regard to docu-
ments. In light of the confusion of the Second Circuit in this area,
where it has had more opportunity to consider the problems than any
other court, one can validly wonder if the requirements of White and
Shapiro in the application of their respective holdings can have any
currency anywhere except in the Supreme Court. And the refusal of
certiorari in the Field case leaves the whole question still in doubt.
However, since one holding of the Field opinion was overruled in the
Curcio case," perhaps there is not so much significance in that as
might be presumed.
The closest any circuit court has come to applying the imperson-
ality test of the White case occurred in Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control BdVs Section 3 of the Subversive Activities Con-
36 Justice Reed, 193 F.2d 86 (1951); Judge Swan, 190 F.2d 554 (1951); judge
Learned Hand, 190 F.2d 556 (1951) ; and the three judges who heard the principal
case on appeal.
37 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
38 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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trol Act of 1950" requires "Communist-action organizations" to fur-
nish membership lists to the Attorney-General and to give certain
other information, including complete financial data. One of the issues
raised was that to require an officer to sign such a list and report was
to require him to give testimony against himself. And further, it was
urged that the Communist party was not an organization of so "im-
personal" a character as to come within the rule of the White case.
The majority, citing United States v. White, found that, were a grand
jury to subpoena the records and membership list of the party, the
custodian thereof would be compelled to produce. The court recounted
the facts of White and quoted those provisions of the holding which
were broad in their language, seemingly making any association's cus-
todian amenable to process. The only reference to the White test as
the writer has set it out was the statement that, if records of labor
unions were not subject to the privilege, then the records of political
parties were not either, because a political party was far more "imper-
sonal" than a labor union. The dissent"0 held that, since the party
was engaged in a criminal conspiracy, the "public" features of other
associations which made their activities "impersonal" were not present.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but reversed
the court of appeals decision on non-constitutional grounds and there-
fore, did not reach the problem of constitutional privilege.41
The bases for excluding books and records of organizations from
the claim of personal privilege on the part of their custodian are two-
fold. First, the records are not his property-he has them only in a
representative capacity and therefore cannot assert a privilege that
is personal to him with regard to the property held by him in this
purely official capacity. Second, the organization whose representative
he is, is not a natural person but an entity that exists only through
a grant of the state or at least enjoys peculiar benefits derived from
the state. Thus, the organization which enjoys a special status must
be amenable to the laws of the society. No means of dealing with
organizations exist except through their agents. And since the organi-
zation does not have a privilege against self-incrimination, 2 its agents
should not be able to assert one on its behalf. Since the organization
cannot assert a privilege through its agents, and the agents cannot
assert a privilege in their own behalf with regard to documents not
64 STAT. 989, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 781-826 (1950).
40 223 F2d at pp. 578-579.
41 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956).42Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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held by them in a personal capacity, no privilege will exist as to asso-
ciation records, provided the organization is created or peculiarly
benefited by the state. 3
There are any number of organizations which do not meet these
criteria. It might be suggested that thereby they fall without the test
of the White case. The major problem in supporting this theory with
case law is a practical one-the type of organization which falls out-
side this test is not likely to have its records subjected to judicial
process. If the organization is not engaged in an activity which is
subject to government regulation and to a regulatory requirement that
it keep certain records, so as to fall within the scope of the Shapiro
rule, nor engaged in an impersonal group endeavor, so as to come within
the White holding, the situations in which its records are likely to be
pertinent would seem to be limited to civil actions regarding funds or
denial of membership benefits." In those cases the claim of privilege
on the basis of self-incrimination is unlikely to become pertinent,
because the civil suit situation can be resolved by application of rules
of court denying the right to proceed to parties who refuse to make
discovery.45 But there remains a problem for the attorney whose
client is a custodian of records which might provide a link in the chain
of evidence against him in a future criminal trial as to whether there
is ever a recognized basis for a claim of privilege and, if so, if there
is one in the particular case of his client.
One might deduce from the language already quoted from the White
case that at least the court was unwilling to assert that no situations
which would make the claim of personal privilege sustainable existed.
The court there stated a test to be applied, and no further help can
be derived from that opinion except for the holding that a labor union
clearly came within the scope of that test. The Field case, since it did
not apply the test in discussing its holding, does not provide any
further assistance unless it be a suggestion that the test is not going
to receive a broad construction by courts in the future. And, except
for the Communist Party case, there is a complete dearth of cases
which do apply the White test. Thus, any suggestions as to criteria
for applying the test of impersonality contained within this Comment
43 Query if this is the test proposed by the Court in United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694 (1944), at least in substance.
44 An example is found in Bradley v. O'Hare, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1956).
45 See RULEs OF PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE, RuIE 37, 34a Wn.2d 101
(1951). But see Bradley v. O'Hare, supra.
[WINTE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
are deserving of no acceptance except as opinions of the writer derived
from somewhat scant inferences.
One of the primary difficulties in the application of the White test
by courts or its use in advising clients is the generality of its terms
and the contradiction inherent in its language. Perhaps the majority
of organizations perform some personal service or confer some pri-
vate benefit upon their members, while at the same time advancing
group or common interests in an impersonal manner. The language
used by the court states two propositions; (1) that the organization
not be purely private or personal in its membership or activities, and
(2) that it embody their common or group interests only. A large
majority of organizations are not purely private, so as to come within
the one test, nor concerned with common or group interests only, so
as to fall within the other. The key word "impersonal" has been seized
upon by those courts acknowledging the existence of the test. But
until some decisions have come directly to grips with this problem and
cast some light upon the application of this language, it provides a
meager basis for a determination of legal right. The idea embodied in
this test, were it developed by further case law into a workable tool, is
realistic and a legitimate distinction upon which to determine the
existence of constitutional privilege. The suggestion that no fiduciary
or person acting in a representative capacity can claim the privilege
will not stand the test of discriminate inspection. 6
Nevertheless, it would seem an appropriate observation that the
situations in which a custodian will be able to raise successfully a privi-
lege that he personally would be incriminated by documents of an
organization are going to be rare. The lack of federal or state cases
allowing such a claim gives scant encouragement to the counsel con-
templating advising such a plea except where the state refuses to
follow federal cases.
It is clear from the Curcio opinion, however, that a custodian is not
bound to give oral testimony which might incriminate him in relation
to his non-production or prior custody of the documents. Nor can he
be compelled to say orally what the documents would contain if pro-
duced. The court specifically reserved the question as to whether he
could be required to identify the documents as genuine and distin-
guished that question on the basis that to require such an assertion of
46 What would be the status of notes interchanged by members of a criminal con-
spiracy and plans drawn by them when held by one member of the conspiracy? This
is perhaps the extreme example, but nevertheless, here one has an "organization."
195;.,
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genuineness was only to make explicit that which was implicit in the
very act of production. Thus, it infers that not only can the custo-
dian refuse to testify orally in the case where he fails to produce, but
also can refuse to testify in any particular about documents he does
produce where such particular might add a link to the chain of evi-
dence against him. If nothing else, the case reaffirms the proposition
that the privilege against self-incrimination does exist in this area and
that the custodian is not wholly without the privilege when he appears
in response to the subpoenas.
SuMMARY
The present status of the law with regard to custodians of organiza-
tion records and the privilege against self-incrimination can be sum-
marized in a series of rather terse rules leaving no room for argument
and in two questions which have answers of only doubtful validity.
An officer of a corporation cannot withhold either testimony or docu-
ments on the basis that his corporation would be incriminated. Nor
may the custodian of an unincorporated association withhold docu-
ments on the basis that his association or he, himself, would be in-
criminated by their production where the organization is so impersonal
in the scope of its membership or activities that it embodies their
common or group interests only, rather than their personal and private
interests. Unions, at least, are such associations. The custodian may
be required to assert the genuineness of documents he produces in
response to a subpoena duces tecum. But the custodian cannot be
required to testify orally concerning the non-production, present
whereabouts, or any details concerning the records produced or not
produced where such testimony might incriminate him. And the claim
of privilege is not available to either an individual or custodian where
the specific records sought are required by a valid exercise of govern-
mental power to be kept by one engaged in a particular activity.
And the questions remain whether the custodian of records of an
unincorporated association may exercise the privilege in response to a
subpoena duces tecum and, if so, what criteria will determine whether
a particular case is a proper one for such a claim to be raised. It has
been fourteen years since the White opinion was handed down, and
there is no indication that an answer to these problems is imminent.
Until such an answer is given by the federal courts, it is doubtful that
the language of the White case will provide a useful refuge to the cus-
todial officer of any organization.
[WINTER
